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RECENT DECISIONS

LABOR LAW APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT APPROPRIATENESS
OF MULTIPLE-PLANT UNIT WHERE MAJORITY IN ONE PLANT OPPOSE
SUCH UNIT The Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., a Pennsylvania corporation,

had six plants in its plate glass division located in five scattered states. In 1938
a C. I. 0. affiliate filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board that
the company had violated the National Labor Relations Act by dominating and
interfering with a company union at the Missouri plant. The company union
was not a party to the proceeding. The company consented to a stipulation and
consent decree directing it to cease and desist from dominating or recognizing
the company union.1 Shortly thereafter in certification proceedings, the board
held that the entire six plants constituted an appropriate unit for collective bargaining, despite the fact that a majority of the employees at the Missouri plant
opposed such a unit. 2 The company union was a party to the latter proceeding,
but was denied the right to introduce evidence as to its representation of the
employees in the Missouri plant, due to the prior consent decree holding it to
be a company-dominated union. The company refused to recognize the right
of the C. I. 0. affiliate to bargain collectively for the Missouri plant, whereupon the board brought an unfair labor practice complaint against the company
and, upon reaffirming its prior determination as to the appropriate unit, found
the company guilty.3 The circuit court of appeals subsequently affirmed the
board's decision.4 On certiorari to that court, held, that the company union

1 Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 8 N. L. R. B. I z IO ( I 93 8), enforced in
N. L. R. B. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) roz F. (2d) 1004.
2 Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Io N. L. R. B. I I I I ( I 93 9).
3 Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 515 (1939). Board member
Leiserson wrote a strong dissent, in the course of which he said (pp. 530, 533): "I
do not think the Board is vested with authority by the Act to extend to employees in
unorganized plants the representatives chosen by organized workers in other plants. • ••
Even if the employer misbehaved, that does not justify the Board in taking away from
his employees the right guaranteed by the Act to have a representative of their own
choosing. • • • I do not believe that the Act authorizes the Board to establish any
bargaining units that suit the fancy of its members."
~ Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 113 F. (2d)
698.
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had a sufficient hearing and the evidence excluded would not have materially
affected the issue, and that the evidence was sufficient to establish the appropriateness of the employer-wide unit. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 908. 5
This is the first case wherein the United States Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the board's power to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit. The Court had held previously that there could be no review of a board
certification of a union as the representative in an appropriate unit until the
board issued an order relative to an unfair labor practice. 6 It had already been
held by lower federal courts that only the board could determine the appropriate
unit,7 and that the board's determination would not be reversed unless arbitrary. 8
The only standard laid down in the act is that the board shall decide the appropriate unit "to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this
chapter." 9 The board, therefore, has a very broad discretion and the facts of each
case are largely determinative,10 but it has indicated that among the factors
considered are the history of collective bargaining in the unit suggested, the type
of labor organization which had previously prevailed, the integration of the
business, the similarity of skill, wages, working conditions, and work of the
employees, and the geographical location of the plants.11 In the instant case, the
idea that there had been any history of employer-wide bargaining by the C. I. 0.
affiliate is dispelled by an analysis of the evidence made in the dissent by Mr.
5
Justice Stone wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion, concurred in by Justices
Hughes and Roberts, holding that the board had failed to grant the company union
an appropriate hearing and had failed to decide the unfair labor issue on the evidence.
6
American Federation of Labor v. N. L. R. B., 308 U. S. 401, 60 S. Ct. 300
(1940); N. L. R. B. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308 U. S.
413, 60 S. Ct. 306 (1940). The legislative history of the act verifies the Court's
holding. See S. REP. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), p. 14 (Committee on Education and Labor); also H. REP. II47, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), p. 23 (Committee
on Labor).
7
Fur Workers Union, Local No. 720 v. Fur Workers Union, No. 21238, (App.
D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 1.
8
Bussman Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) III F. (2d) 783,
where the Court affirmed the board's designation of a craft unit consisting of I 3 tool
and die workers in the company's two plants in St. Louis; International Assn. of
Machinists v. N. L. R. B., (App. D. C. 1939) 110 F. (2d) 29 at 46, note 36;
N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 94 F (2d) 138, where the
court affirmed the board's exclusion of 56 employees (including 30 Japanese) from an
employer unit by merely saying that such action was not arbitrary even though it had
· the effect of giving the union a majority it otherwise would not have had; N. L. R. B.
v. Sunshine Mining Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) II0 F. (2d) 780, where clerical
workers were excluded.
9
49 Stat. L. 453, § 9 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 159 (b).
10
Matter of Bendix Products Corp., 3 N. L. R. B. 682 (1937); N. L. R. B.,
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 63-64 (1940); 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 3 39 ( I 940) •
11
N. L. R. B., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 89-90 (1939).
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Leiserson.12 On this test, then, the Missouri plant should not have been included
in the unit and the Court's acceptance of the conclusion of the majority of the
board seems questionable. As to integration of the business, there was never any
interchange of employees between the plants nor other contacts facilitating their
exchange of view, and hence the evidence on this point seems rather neutral.
Although there seems to be similarity of working conditions, it would seem
reasonable to use that factor as a test only to the extent of requiring its presence
before holding an employer-wide unit appropriate. In previous cases the board
had held the geographical factor important, refusing to put plants widely scattered in the same unit.13 Here over 600 miles separated this plant from any of
the others, and there was no history of collective bargaining or organization
including this plant to overcome this factor. In several cases the board had held
before that cooperation or non-cooperation in strikes was a factor. 14 Here the
Missouri plant had refused to participate in a strike by the other five plants of
the company. In many previous cases the board had held that it would include
plants in one unit to the extent only of the organization by the union requesting
such inclusion.15 Yet here the C. I. 0. a.ffiliate's organization did not extend
to the Missouri plant, and at least 1500 of the 1800 employees there belonged
to the company union and opposed an employer-wide unit. Hence the designation by the board seems to have been contrary to its own holdings in other cases,
12
Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 515 at 530-533 (1939),
where Mr. Leiserson pointed out that although a contract the union had with the
company for 3 years prior to 1937 did not exclude specifically the Missouri plant,
nevertheless the rates, etc., did not apply to that plant and it was never dealt with as
though covered by that contract. Furthermore, the 1937 contract existing when this
case arose specifically excluded the Missouri plant.
13
Matter of Industrial Rayon Corp., 7 N. L. R. B. 878 (1938); Matter of
Atlantic Refining Co., I N. L. R. B. 359 (1936). In both of these cases the plants
were more than 100 miles apart. Cf.,however,N.L.R. B. v. Remington-Rand, (C. C.A.
2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862, where the company's six plants scattered through three
states were put in one unit, without any discussion of the appropriateness of the unit
by the court.
14
Matter of Ohio Foundry Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 701 (1937); Matter of Rossie
Velvet Co., 3 N. L. R. B. 804 (1938); Matter of Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 7 N. L.
R. B. 229 (1938).
15
Matter of National Distillers Products Corp., 20 N. L. R. B., No. 49 (1940);
Matter of Middle West Corp., 10 N. L. R. B. 618 (1938); Matter of Colorado
Builders' Supply Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 29 (1939).
In N. L. R. B., FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT 90 (1939), the board stated that
"whenever some union requests an employer-wide unit and has organized to that
extent, the Board may then designate the wider unit." (Italics added.) The report
then cites the instant case and says: "The Board established the division-wide unit
since the only bona fide union had organized the employees throughout the division."
But the board had admitted ,in a preceding statement that the majority of the employees at the Missouri plant opposed such a unit, and its own findings in the case, as
reported in 15 N. L. R. B. 515 (1939), showed that at least 1500 of the 1800 in that
plant belonged to the local company union. In Matter of Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass
Co., ION. L. R. B. 1470 (1939), the board designated a seven-plant unit despite the
will of the majority in one of the plants, but reversed itself shortly before the Supreme
Court opinion in the instant case.
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and in fact the board reverted to its original principles in two recent cases
shortly before the Court issued its decision in the instant case.16 The board and
the Court s.eem to place some reliance on the fact that the company during the
course of a strike had transferred some of its business to the Missouri plant until
the strike ended, but this consideration hardly prevents the board's decision from
being arbitrary. Even if the plant is included within the unit, the employees
there may not choose to cooperate in a strike with the other plants in the future
any more than in the past, and furthermore the Court has held previously that
an employer has a right to replace strikers for the duration of a strike in order
to keep his business operating.17 Even more surprising is the Court's affirmance
of the board's power to d.eny to the company union the right to introduce evidence as to whether it was dominated and whether it represented the desires of
the workers in the Missouri plant, on the theory that it was foreclosed by the
prior consent decree finding the company guilty of domination in a proceeding
to which the company union was not a party. The board is probably sound in
holding that the desire of a company-dominated union has no weight in determining the proper unit,1 8 but the union should at least have a chance to present evidence as to the issue of domination. The well-reasoned dissent by three
members of the Court seems fundamentally sound in insisting that an exercise
of administrative discretion, to accord with due process, requires first a hearing
of all the relevant evidence, and that the right of the company union to introduce such evidence could not constitutionally be denied because of a consent
decree in a proceeding of which it had no notice and to which it was not a party.
But aside from that issue, it is highly questionable whether the Court should
have affirmed an order which denied to workers. in a plant widely separated from
the others the right to select freely their own labor organization or none at all.

Oliver B. Crager

16 Matter of Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., N. L. R. B. No. C-1771, decided
April 23, 1941, 9 U. S. L. W. 2326 (1941), where the board reversed its own ruling
in ION. L. R. B. 1470 (1939) and allowed one plant to become a separate unit from
the other six; Matter of Atlas Underwear Co., 30 N. L. R. B., No. 89 (1941), where
two plants 48 miles apart were held to be separate units contrary to the wishes of the
petitioning union, since the union had never succeeded in bargaining on an employerwide basis.
11 N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 58 S. Ct.
904 (1938).
18 See numerous board decisions to this effect cited in N. L. R. B., FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT 83, note,46 (1939).

